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Corporate Power over Human Rights: An Analytical Framework 
David Birchall 
 
This paper presents an original framework designed to systemize understandings of corporate 
power over human rights. The framework disaggregates four sites of this power: corporations 
have direct power over individuals’ human rights, power over the materialities of human rights, 
power over institutions governing human rights, and power over knowledge around human 
rights. This disaggregation is derived primarily from the work of Barnett and Duvall, and 
focuses on effects of corporate activity, rather than the Weberian understanding of power as 
the ability to achieve desired outcomes. The framework captures a broad set of corporate acts 
based on their (potential) harm to human rights. It is argued that understanding business and 
human rights through the lens of power can help to advance a more comprehensive account of 




















The extent of business responsibility toward human rights is a major topic within contemporary 
human rights discourse.1 Separately, many scholars have attempted to understand power in the 
global economy,2 and specifically corporate power over actors or arenas such as states,3 
markets,4 or global governance.5 However, there has been little work done to understand, map, 
and systematize the relationship between corporate power and human rights.6 This is a valuable 
project for at least three reasons. First, as business and human rights (BHR) is evolving and 
corporations are increasingly accepting a responsibility to respect human rights, 7 an analysis 
of corporate power over human rights helps understand the breadth of business impacts upon 
human rights.8 Second, as an analytical framework, the power analysis herein can be applied 
to discreet situations and to discreet rights, allowing more nuanced approaches to BHR in an 
expansive range of situations. Third, and reflexively, it should assist in emancipating BHR 
                                                 
1 David Jason Karp, Responsibility for human rights: transnational corporations in imperfect states. Vol. 130. 
Cambridge University Press, 2014; Nadia Bernaz, Business and human rights: history, law and policy-bridging 
the accountability gap. Routledge, 2016; Dorothée Baumann-Pauly and Justine Nolan, Business and human 
rights: From principles to practice. Routledge, 2016. 
2 Susan Strange, States and markets Bloomsbury Publishing, 1996 [Strange, States]; Steven Lukes, Power: A 
radical view. Macmillan International Higher Education, 2004 (2nd ed.) [Lukes, Power]; Peter Morriss, Power: a 
philosophical analysis. Manchester University Press, 2002 [Morriss, Power]. 
3 Claire A. Cutler, Private power and global authority: transnational merchant law in the global political 
economy, Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
4 Claire A. Cutler, "Location “Authority” in the Global Political Economy." International Studies Quarterly  
43.1 (1999), 59-81; Christopher May, The global political economy of intellectual property rights: The new 
enclosures. Routledge, 2015. 
5 Doris A. Fuchs, Business power in global governance. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007; Thomas G. Weiss 
and Rorden Wilkinson. "Rethinking global governance? Complexity, authority, power, change." International 
Studies Quarterly 58.1 (2014), 207-215. 
6 Florian Wettstein, Multinational corporations and global justice: human rights obligations of a quasi-
governmental institution. Stanford University Press, 2009 [Wettstein, Justice]; John Gerard Ruggie, 
"Multinationals as global institution: Power, authority and relative autonomy." Regulation & Governance 12.3 
(2018), 317-333 [Ruggie, Power]. 
7 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 
HR/PUB/11/04 (2011), Principle 13 [hereinafter Guiding Principles]. 
8 Following the UNGPs, which discuss a ‘corporate responsibility to respect human rights’ that applies to 
‘business enterprises’. I use ‘corporations’ and ‘business’ interchangeably. The framework applies equally to 
actors that behave in some ways as businesses, for example as employers, because it is predicated on 
understanding power and impacts rather than designating responsibility. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner 




from the minimalism9 accrued through legal enforcement and corporate volunteerism,10 by 
offering a framework predicated on understanding, rather than immediate enforceability.11   
 
Power is defined following Barnett and Duvall as ‘the production, in and through social 
relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and 
fate.’12 From this I define corporate power over human rights as the production, by business 
enterprises, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of individuals 
to enjoy their human rights. More simply, corporate power over human rights is the ability of 
business enterprises to shape individuals’ human rights realization, retrogression or 
possibilities. Barnett and Duvall highlight the importance of ‘effects on the capacities and 
courses of action available to actors [that] are unintentionally produced through social 
relations.’13 This leads to a shift away from a Weberian focus on power as the ability to achieve 
one’s goals,14 and to a more comprehensive focus on causing influential effects. This allows 
for a more inclusive approach highly relevant to human rights because human rights harm is 
often an externality of business practice.15  
 
The framework adopted herein defines four sites of corporate power over human rights: first, 
power over individuals; second, power over materialities; third, power over institutions; and 
fourth, power over knowledge.16 This captures that human rights are inherent in individuals 
and can be transgressed through direct interaction. It captures that all human rights, but 
particularly socio-economic rights, rest on a material foundation, and that corporations are 
economic actors with significant ability to interfere with this material foundation. It captures 
                                                 
9 Florian Wettstein, "CSR and the debate on business and human rights: Bridging the great divide." Business 
Ethics Quarterly 22.4 (2012), 739-770. 
10 One such example is Tombs and Whyte’s focus on the intersection of ‘crime’ and ‘social harm’, an 
intersection often defined very differently around corporate and individual acts of wrongdoing: Steve Tombs 
and David Whyte, The corporate criminal: Why corporations must be abolished. Routledge, 2015, 35-6; 50-4; 
Grietje Baars, "“It’s not me, it’s the corporation”: the value of corporate accountability in the global political 
economy." London Review of International Law 4.1 (2016), 127-163. 
11 Strange, States, n. 2, 16ff. well describes the rationale of power analyses.  
12 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall. "Power in international politics." International organization 59.1 
(2005), 39-75, 42 [Barnett and Duvall, Power]. 
13 id. 44. 
14 Max Weber, Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology, University of California Press, 1978 
(first published 1922). 
15 This question is addressed in Peter Morriss, "Steven Lukes on the concept of power." Political Studies 
Review 4.2 (2006), 124-135. 
16 The framework is predicated on ‘where’ corporations have power, rather than ‘how’. The ‘how’ question – an 





that human rights are legal standards and are implemented through governance structures that 
corporations may also influence. And it captures the epistemic framework through which we 
understand human rights, particularly in terms of form, scope, limits and duty-bearers. The 
normative aim of this framework is to understand in totality how corporations may retrogress 
access to rights, structurally-inhibit the realization of rights, and cause a range of impacts upon 
rights that have not traditionally been centred within BHR discourse, in order to better 
understand exactly what it means, and what it takes, for a corporation to  ‘respect’ human 
rights.17 This is not to claim that every potentially harmful interaction that corporations may 
have with human rights should be prohibited. It is to claim that the only way to analyse whether 
such interactions should be prohibited or ameliorated is to start from the business actions 
themselves, rather than the contingencies of legal, regulatory, or corporate praxis.  
 
The paper proceeds first with a brief description of the understanding of human rights adopted 
herein. Section three discusses theories of power.  Section four describes the framework itself, 
and section five provides examples of each element of power therein. The final section 
concludes.  
 
2. Human Rights  
 
There are many debates in human rights around justiciability,18 ‘displacement’,19 
‘minimalism’,20 and ‘formative aims’,21 debates essentially around the limits of human rights 
law and practice.22 The listed debates each involve strategic restrictions on the scope of rights 
for the purpose of enforceability or normative force. Herein I limit relevant rights to those 
established by treaty law and applicable to business under the UN Guiding Principles on 
                                                 
17 For detailed analysis of the term see: David Birchall, ‘Any Act, Any Harm, To Anyone: The Transformative 
Potential of “Human Rights Impacts” Under the UN Guiding Principles of Business and Human 
Rights’ 1.2 University of Oxford Human Rights Hub Journal (2019) 120; David Birchall, ‘Irremediable impacts 
and unaccountable contributors: the possibility of a trust fund for victims to remedy large-scale human rights 
impacts’, Australian Journal of Human Rights 25.3 (2019) 428-447. 
18 Aoife Nolan, Bruce Porter, and Malcolm Langford, ‘The justiciability of social and economic rights: An 
updated appraisal’, Challenges in International Human Rights Law. Routledge (20170 89. 
19 Paul O'Connell, "Human rights: Contesting the displacement thesis." 69.1 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 
19 (2018). 
20 Joshua Cohen, "Minimalism about human rights: The most we can hope for?." Journal of political 
philosophy 12.2 (2004), 190-213; Eva Brems, "Human rights: Minimum and maximum perspectives." Human 
Rights Law Review 9.3 (2009), 349-372. 
21 John Tasioulas, "Minimum core obligations: Human rights in the here and now." World Bank (2017), 5-8. 




Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). 23 I do not consider any strategic restrictions on the 
scope of these rights because the purpose is to understand business interactions with human 
rights, including at the level of discourse and institutions. Such interactions will rarely be 
conceivable as breaches of specific responsibilities but do nonetheless impact the possibilities 
for rights realization. The purpose is not simply to extend the list of possible breaches, but 
rather it is to develop a way of thinking about BHR that captures the full extent of business-
human rights interaction. 
The understanding of human rights herein is comparable to Thomas Pogge’s, who states that 
‘[t]he postulate of a human right to X is tantamount to the demand that, insofar as reasonably 
possible, any coercive social institutions be so designed that all human beings have secure 
access to X’.24 Taking this as a normative ideal, we can say that, ideally, corporations and the 
structures in which they operate should be designed so as to assist in human rights realization. 
This entails identifying the various means by which corporations can affect human rights, and 
particularly the ways in which corporations and their institutional environment are currently 
less than conducive to rights realization. This basic conception of human rights allows the 
research to centre the human right itself in a non-exclusionary manner.  
Human rights are therefore conceived as the basis of both minimal sufficiency and the 
realization of the good life.25 The progressive realization of these rights is social progress. 
Retrogressions of access to rights are retrogressions of society, signs of social decay. A crucial 
question, particularly in the era of globalization, is to understand and challenge the (new) ways 
in which realization may be inhibited and retrogression promoted. For example, each individual 
has a right to housing recognized in international law and under the UNGPs.26 This right is 
                                                 
23 The Guiding Principles list as the ‘core internationally recognized human rights’ the ‘Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the main instruments through which it has been codified: the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), coupled with the 
principles concerning fundamental rights in the eight ILO core conventions as set out in the Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work’ It adds that business enterprises may need to consider additional 
standards as elaborated in other UN instruments. The paper stays within these limits regarding the applicable 
human rights, without prejudice to the idea that some specific rights beyond these core doctrines may be 
significant and may be violated by corporations. Guiding Principles, n Error! Bookmark not defined., 
Principle 12. 
24 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, Polity, 2008, 46 
25 This perspective is advanced in Wettstein, Justice, n. 6, 100-9, particularly 107-9. 
26 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 





organized along seven core elements, including affordability and habitability.27 The right is 
realized within a jurisdiction when all individuals therein have secure access to housing 
including each of its seven components. Because business is so deeply involved in housing, 
numerous business acts can adversely impact this right, of which only a sliver are widely 
accepted legal breaches.28 Centring the right and its core elements allows us to encompass all 
means by which the right may be affected, allowing us to encompass investors, lobbyists, 
credit, speculation, data-management and more. This then generates a comprehensive view of 
the business-related impediments to realization which can then be used to reconsider rights-
based responsibilities. What constitutes a ‘blameworthy act’,29 in Ruggie’s terminology, 
depends on our understanding of rights, harm, and corporate influence.30  
3. Theories of Power 
 
This section reviews the literature on power. Power studies developed from the fields of 
political science and international relations. A core tenet of realism as proposed by E.H. Carr 
was that the ‘idealists’ he critiqued ignored how (state) power operated and was 
instrumentalized.31 Carr’s realist conception of power was primarily ‘compulsory’, or in 
different terminology, ‘relational’ or ‘instrumental’. This is the direct, coercive use of power 
wherein one actor compels another to act in a way that is beneficial to the former.32 Kenneth 
Waltz updated realism in 1979 with his conception of neorealism, or structural realism, which 
focused on how international structures – notably the lack of global government, or 
international anarchy – directed actors down certain paths.33 Alexander Wendt later added the 
social constructivist rebuttal to the realists, arguing that anarchy exists but is malleable and is 
impacted by the subjectivities of actors toward it.34 Concurrently, Marxist and Gramscian-
                                                 
27 CESCR, General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11 (1) of the Covenant), 13 December 
1991, E/1992/23, para. 8(c) [CESCR, General Comment 4], paragraph 8.  
28 Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of 
living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context, The Financialization of Housing, A/HRC/34/51 
(2017), at: http://www.unhousingrapp.org/user/pages/04.resources/Thematic-Report-3-The-Financialization-of-
Housing.pdf [hereinafter, UNSR, Financialization] [last accessed 29 March 2020]. 
29 Human Rights Council, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and 
Accountability for Corporate Acts, A/HRC/4/35 (19 February 2007), para. 3.  
30 This general topic is well-treated in: Andrew Linklater, The problem of harm in world politics: Theoretical 
investigations. Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
31 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: an Introduction to the Study of International Relations, 
London: Macmillan, 1939. 
32 Robert Dahl, ‘The Concept of Power’ 2.3 Behavioral Science 201 (1957) 202-3. 
33 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of international politics, Waveland Press, 1979. 
34 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics." International 




inspired scholars studied global power with a materialist focus on economic power.35 Liberal 
Institutionalism, linked to global governance studies today, focused on the mediating power of 
global institutions and the potential for cooperation among actors.36 Each of these conceptions 
has relevance for corporate power today.37 
 
The past century saw three major forms of power analysis develop: relational, structural, and 
discursive. Prior to Carr, Max Weber had defined power as ‘the probability that one actor 
within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance’.38 
Power was therefore defined as the ability to achieve desired outcomes. This relational view of 
power is concerned with the link between capabilities and goals.39 It states that one can see 
power in its operation when the relevant actor has achieved its goal. As per Morriss, it does not 
necessarily entail effects or influences upon other actors.40 This is problematic when focusing 
on power over human rights because the very aim is to link the corporate capacities of power 
with effects on human rights. Corporate power can harm human rights even when the goal is 
not achieved, such as damage occurring at the exploration stage of a mining project.41 Lukes, 
revising his previous conception, states that power should be defined ‘in terms of agents’ 
abilities to bring about significant effects’.42  
 
Susan Strange studied structural power,  defined as the power ‘to decide how things shall be 
done, the power to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to people, 
or relate to corporate enterprises’.43 Wettstein notes two forms of this power, which herein I 
will term ‘market’ and ‘structural’ power.44 Market power is the use of a structural power to 
                                                 
35 Robert W. Cox, Production, power, and world order: Social forces in the making of history. Vol. 1. Columbia 
University Press, 1987. 
36 Robert O. Keohane, After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton 
University Press, 2005; Robert O. Keohane, "International institutions: Two approaches." International studies 
quarterly 32.4 (1988), 379-396. 
37 Mikler, who studied corporate power from the perspective of international political economy, also starts from 
these delineations as ways of considering power. John Mikler, The Political Power of Global Corporations, 
Polity, 2018, 23-28 [Mikler, Power]. 
38 Max Weber, Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology. University of California Press, 1978, 
53 (first published 1922). 
39 See Wettstein, Justice, n 6, 193, for a discussion of emergent structuralism in the work of Max Weber. 
40 Morriss, Power, n 2, 30. 
41 Dos Santos and Seck forthcoming in DAVID BIRCHALL AND SURYA DEVA (EDS.) RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS, Edward Elgar (forthcoming, 2020). 
42 Lukes, Power, n 2, 65. 
43 Strange, States, n 2, 25. 




‘influence bargaining positions’, for example bargaining for favourable tax conditions when 
considering where to invest.45 I refer to this as market power because it utilizes market power 
imbalances to create a more favourable condition. This ‘constitutes a hybrid position between 
structural and relational power’.46 Structural power is the ability to determine outcomes 
because of a structural reality.47 For instance, the structural reality of corporate free movement 
allows companies freedom over their manufacturing locations.48 Here they do not need to 
bargain in order to manipulate conditions.  
 
Later theorists, drawn from poststructuralism and constructivism, added discursive power, a 
meta-level power to shape discourse and social norms in one’s favour,49 though with 
similarities to Strange’s notion of a knowledge structure (below). Discursive power occurs 
where corporations are able to shape outcomes ‘through promoting ideas, setting social norms 
and expectations, and even shaping identities.’50 Discourse, for Foucault, is the process of 
formation that occurs through language. Discourses produce fields of knowledge and set the 
boundaries of that knowledge.51 The conditions of truth within a historical period are 
determined discursively, defining what can and cannot be said, and who can speak on which 
topics authoritatively.52 Discursive power is particularly important therefore in interpreting 
situations and providing narrative structures, problems, and apportioning blame.53 This is both 
the softest and perhaps the most pervasive form of power, wherein one exercises power ‘by 
influencing, shaping or determining [another’s] very wants’.54 It is a form of power that ‘does 
not simply pursue interests, but creates them’.55 It is, notes Fuchs, closely tied to legitimacy – 
an actor seen as legitimate may be able to shape our understanding of a particular event or 
issue.56  
 
                                                 
45 id. 194. 
46 id. 195. 
47 id. 194. 
48 Ruggie, Power, n 6,  5. 
49 Fuchs, Power, n 5, 60. 
50 Ruggie, Power, n 6, 9. 
51 Michel Foucault. "Orders of discourse." 10.2 Information (International Social Science Council) (1971), 7. 
52 Nina Kolleck. ‘How Global Companies Wield their Power’ in Mikler ed. The Handbook of Global Companies 
Wiley- Blackwell, UK, 2013: 134. 
53 Fuchs, Power, n 5, 60. 
54 Lukes, Power, n 2, 23. 
55 Fuchs, Power, n 6, 61. 




However, the relational-structural-discursive trichotomy, has been challenged as an imprecise 
lens on power. Strange challenged her precursors who separated ‘political’ from ‘economic’ 
power, on the grounds that they are too interwoven. Political power relies on economic power, 
‘to purchase, to command production’, and economic power relies on ‘the sanction of political 
authority’.57 However, the distinction between relational and structural power is also less than 
clear. Particularly, Strange is at times at risk of constructing structural power as an eternal given 
to contrast it with active, directed relational power. She uses the Cold War example of US 
structural power over how wheat and corn were sold globally, which coerced even the Soviet 
Union into accepting the financialized technique.58 But this structural power over the Soviet 
Union surely rested fulsomely on the US’s relational power. A change in relative power 
between the two would likely have led to either the Soviet Union’s evasion or evisceration of 
this system. Structural power is always contingent on relational, and other forms of structural, 
power. Discursive power is equally interlinked with the other elements, resting it must partially 
on the strength of argumentation, but also, inter alia, on the funding and political legitimacy of 
the organization. This is well explained by work in the Marxist tradition which reifies the 
intersections between different forms of power. The idea that ‘law’ or ‘relations’ are delineable 
sources of, for example, an employer’s power over an employee cannot be adequately 
sustained.59 The idea that relational, structural and discursive power are truly separable is also 
therefore difficult to sustain. 
 
This does not render the relational, structural, discursive delineation useless. Even if frequently 
interwoven in terms of the practice and effects of power, there is an evident divide that fits 
many actions. One can see a public relations campaign as an attempt to exercise discursive 
power, even if the likelihood of success rests on other forms of power, and note that this is 
distinct from achieving the same end through coercion. It does, however, mean that the 
delineation of examples of power over human rights into one of the tripartite forms may not be 
the most useful task, since often an outcome, such as rights retrogression, will often involve a 
set of acts with elements of each form of power.  
 
                                                 
57 Strange, States, n 2, 25-26. 
58 id. 25; 82-4. 
59 Karl Klare, ‘Law-Making as Praxis’, Telos 40 (1979); Liam McHugh-Russell, ‘Getting the Constitutive 
Power of Law Wrong’ Legal Form, March 31 2018, at: 
https://legalform.blog/2018/03/31/getting-the-constitutive-power-of-law-wrong-liam-mchugh-russell/ [last 




A more useful starting point may be Strange’s definition of four power structures: security, 
production, finance, and knowledge. These she describes as the four structures through which 
power operates in the contemporary political economy.60 Whoever controlled a structure within 
a particular circumstance could define how others behaved and define outcomes to a relevant 
degree. The four structures are derived from human need within economic, political and social 
spheres.61 Humans need security and the provider of that security exercises structural power 
over a range of areas, including, potentially, the extent of free movement and taxation.62 
Productive power relates to who, how and what shall be produced. It incorporates ‘land, labour, 
capital and technology’.63 The financial structure relates specifically to credit but today could 
incorporate a range of financial instruments which shape markets and lives. Finally, the 
knowledge structure relates to the power to create and reify knowledge within the global 
economy, and in a more constructivist vein, relates to the setting of social norms and popular 
discourses.  
 
4. Corporate Power over Human Rights 
 
Barnett and Duvall drew from Strange and related works to develop the model that my own 
borrows from most closely. As noted, Barnett and Duvall prioritize the capacity to cause 
effects, rather than the ability to achieve a desired outcome, and this is useful when examining 
power over human rights.64  They disaggregate power into compulsory, institutional, structural, 
and productive elements to provide a comprehensive categorization of power in its totality. 
This merges Strange’s use of delineated sites of power with the understandings of power 
developed in international relations literature, with ‘compulsory’ being related to the realist 
view of power, ‘structural’ the Marxist view, and so on. This respects the major traditions of 
international relations, capturing their priorities to understand power in a comprehensive 
fashion. There is a key distinction between the purpose of my own framework and that of 
Barnett and Duvall. Barnett and Duvall sought to understand ‘Power in International Politics’, 
encompassing the full gamut of actors and sites. My framework is more limited, focusing only 
on business actors and their power over human rights. Business has power over human rights 
insofar as it can influence, violate, retrogress, reshape, realise or restrict those rights. The 
                                                 
60 Strange, States, n 2, 29-32. 
61 id. and ff. 
62 id. 29. 
63 id. 29. 




important element is therefore to delineate the sites within the global order wherein the 
possibilities for rights realization are structured and from that to trace how business can impact 
these sites.  
 
Where then, does corporate power over human rights operate? I argue that it does so at four 
delineable sites: power over individuals, power over materialities, power over institutions, and 
power over discourse. The first is the direct, unmediated or weakly mediated power that 
corporations can wield over rights-holders. The next three are mediating sites through which 
corporate power can be used to affect human rights. Human rights are underlain by material 
foundations, whether land, supply of essential goods, personal wealth, or state funding, and 
therefore materialism is crucial. They are overarched by law and institutions that enforce and 
structure the rights. And they are affected at the meta-level by social norms which constitute 
knowledge around the right, most importantly the scope, limits and form of the responsibilities 
inherent therein. This captures realist, institutionalist, Marxist and constructivist priorities.65 
The following paragraphs explain and justify each inclusion and their relationship to Barnett 
and Duvall’s choices.  
 
Barnett and Duvall define compulsory power as the ‘range of relations between actors that 
allow one to shape directly the circumstances or actions of another’.66 In the subheading this is 
simply ‘direct control over another’.67 This is derived from a realist notion of ‘pure’ power, in 
which the more powerful actor can coerce the weaker actor. Their international relations 
framework focuses on major actors – states, multinational corporations, intergovernmental 
organizations. My framework focuses on the business-human rights relationship and I therefore 
narrow compulsory power to cover only direct power over individuals (including communities 
of individuals), the power to directly impact individuals’ human rights. Corporations exercising 
‘compulsory’ power over a state (insofar as that is possible) would be mediating their power 
over human rights through the state, using the institution for its own ends and this is therefore 
placed in the ‘institutional’ category. The Barnett and Duvall definition is therefore altered to: 
‘the power that a corporation has to shape directly the human rights possibilities of 
individuals’. It is primarily a relational form of power, although one that necessarily utilizes 
extant structures, not least the employer-employee contractual relationship. It also includes 
                                                 
65 id. 43. 





human rights violations, which we could term an ‘acute compulsory power’ wherein the 
company has forcibly wronged an individual or group.  
 
Second, power over materialities merges Strange’s ‘productive’ and ‘financial’ structures and 
what Barnett and Duvall term ‘structural power’, concerning the role of structural positions 
(e.g. capital-labour)68 in constituting one’s choices and possibilities. Within my own 
framework some such structural relationships are encompassed elsewhere, such as capital-
labour as a direct power over individuals, and structural positions are equally important in a 
discursive sense. The framework itself preselects the relevant structural positions of 
‘corporation’ and ‘rights-holder’. As Barnett and Duvall focus on economic relations in this 
section following a Gramscian view of structuralism,69 I focus on one central element of 
corporate economic power, the role of materialities as a mediating site through which uneven 
power relationships are exploited. Ownership of materials - the means of production, 
distribution, land, and finance – places corporations in a position to dictate access to rights. 
Power over materialities is thus defined as ‘the mediated power that a corporation has to shape 
the human rights possibilities of individuals’ through control of material conditions or 
resources’. This definition captures three major areas: commodified or privatized rights; land 
and environment; and finance. Corporations exert an enormous amount of power through their 
control of material resources, and this control represents a crucial mediating structural 
relationship between corporation and rights-holder. Corporations control large parts of 
marketized socio-economic rights, including food, housing, and sometimes healthcare and can 
withdraw from or otherwise destabilize these markets for economic reasons if they choose. 
They control global finance and have singularly powerful effects on land resources and the 
environment. Rights-holders are often vulnerable to the effects of profit-motivated boardroom 
decisions taken with no malice toward them because the capacity of corporations to affect 
material outcomes is so significant, and because materialities are so central to rights realization. 
The role of corporations as economic actors with significant abilities to impact rights through 
their material power is a vital lens to reify within BHR.  
 
Third is institutional power, which Barnett and Duvall define as ‘the formal and informal 
institutions that mediate between A and B, as A, working through the rules and procedures that 
                                                 
68 id. 53. 




define those institutions, guides, steers, and constrains the actions - or nonactions - and 
conditions of existence of others.’70 This is therefore power exercised through the medium of 
an institution. My definition follows their own: ‘the mediated power that a corporation has to 
shape the human rights possibilities of individuals’ through control of or influence over a 
governance institution’. This covers power within, over and through institutions. Institutions 
include states, inter-governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations. 
‘Governance’ is defined broadly, to include not just state or international regimes but also the 
plethora of global governance institutions. They constitute a specific site through which 
corporations can influence human rights. This may be direct, in the form of lobbying for a legal 
or policy change, it may be in the form of bargaining for conditions more favourable to the 
corporation, and adverse to human rights, or it may involve formally taking control of a 
previously institutionalized function through privatization. As per the lobbying example, it 
does not necessitate true authority within an institution, but rather the ability to use the 
institution for its own purposes.  
 
The fourth form is power over knowledge, most linked to Barnett and Duvall’s ‘productive 
power’,71 defined as ‘the constitution of all social subjects with various social powers through 
systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope’.72 The focus 
is on ‘systems of signification and meaning’, including information, discourses and norms, not 
unlike Strange’s ‘knowledge structure’.73 Here they take the Foucauldian inspired move away 
from ‘structures of subordination’, as in ‘structural power’, toward the post-structuralist focus 
on meta-norms and culture.74 I define power over knowledge as: ‘the power that a corporation 
has to shape knowledge of human rights and the wider epistemic framework in which human 
rights exist’. This therefore most directly incorporates the realm of social constructivism, social 
norms, discursive practices, and intersubjective understandings. The basic idea underlying 
constructivism is that the way communities understand social life and events, even right and 
wrong, is shaped by shared understandings. For my purposes this refers specifically to the 
ability of corporations to reshape human rights-relevant knowledge. This includes the power 
to define their own human rights responsibilities, priorities, exclusions, and to influence the 
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field of BHR. Discursive power readily seeps into interactions with other areas, while often not 
having clearly defined, visible impacts. For this reason, I keep my examples focused on 
corporate acts that specifically and overtly shape knowledge around human rights, while also 
acknowledging the potential breadth of the paradigm.  
 
Powerful actors can impact human rights in a litany of ways. This framework is designed to 
disaggregate these means into four forms to promote the systematic mapping of corporate 
impacts on human rights. It is submitted that every corporate interaction with human rights can 
be fitted into one of the four categories. The vision of human rights that this creates is one in 
which the individual is at the centre of a universe underlain by material conditions, overarched 
by governance, and encircled by discourses and knowledge construction that shape the 
possibilities for each. The framework can be demonstrated simply through four examples 
related to wealth. A corporation can adversely impact the human rights of individuals directly 
by cutting, or not paying, wages, potentially restricting the ability of individuals to ensure their 
own human rights. A corporation that avoids tax may reduce the amount of money available to 
the government to protect rights, thus impacting the material base underlying rights through a 
structural power derived from the reality of economic globalization. A corporation that lobbies 
the government to lower tax rates in return for investment has used the institution of the state 
in a way that may cause adverse impacts. A corporation that funds research into the drawbacks 
of universal healthcare or housing may engender funding cuts, achieving a similar end through 
shaping discourse. In each case the effect is similar (less money to guarantee human rights), 
but the site of the effect is distinct.  
 
As noted regarding discursive power, there will always be potential overlaps within these 
delineations. Institutions play a role in every BHR interaction, whether permissive, facilitative, 
incentivizing, or prohibiting. The corporation is a creation of the state and is everywhere shaped 
by its laws and legal gaps.75 Control of a materiality can create a very direct relationship 
between business and individual, as in the landlord-tenant relationship. But disaggregating 
these four sites, even allowing for potential overlaps, opens space to reconsider the BHR 
spectrum according to these distinctive sites. It opens space to consider the human rights 
impacts of the pure economic activity of corporations, of corporate institutional influence, and 
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of corporate discourse. Acts such as tax avoidance, certain forms of lobbying, and promoting 
a self-serving version of one’s own human rights responsibilities are not human rights 
violations, but they do affect human rights, and they do suggest that the company in question 
does not respect human rights in a comprehensive sense. If a central aim within BHR is to 
create corporations that respect human rights, it is vital to understand the role that every facet 
of corporate activity plays in respecting or disrespecting rights, and to not allow some harmful 
activities to slip by because they are beyond a preordained scope. By making each area visible 
it also allows for linkages between the sites to be identified, for example seeing how lobbying 
can lead to more hegemonic control of a materiality, which then creates the conditions for 
overtly harmful direct interactions. 
 
The key ambition is to link corporate acts to their effects on human rights. The framework 
provides a disaggregated means by which to do this. Here I will illustrate each form of power 
with three examples, each showing a different form of the specific power, and totalling 12 very 
brief case studies of corporate power over human rights. These are, naturally, just a selection 
of examples rather than the entire picture. Nothing in this article should be read as implying 
that business is all powerful in any sector. Rather, the supposition is that businesses can and do 
have impacts in each area. The examples should be read descriptively rather than normatively, 
despite the focus on harm. In some cases, corporate power may be seen as assisting in the 
creation of a middle ground in a still developing field, such as when corporations define their 
own responsibilities. In other cases, one may feel that corporate activity provides totalized 
benefits. This could be the case with supply chain labour, for example. This is not therefore 
meant to necessarily condemn each form in its totality, but to describe it, simply, as a power 
over the human right and to illustrate with examples of the harmful uses of these powers. 
 
4.1. Power over Individuals 
 
Power over individuals is the most likely to include overt compulsory power. It comprises the 
direct interactions that occur between corporations, including managers, and individuals. It 
includes the vast majority of the legal, regulatory and soft law area of BHR, including any 
business harm to human rights that could be considered justiciable or otherwise remediable. 
However, it also includes many human rights-related areas that are not central to BHR. I will 
briefly describe three forms of power over individuals that cause, or have the potential to cause, 




employment opportunities, and the primarily discursive power to incentivize harmful choices 
through marketing.  
 
First, the power to violate or otherwise directly breach an individual’s human rights in such a 
manner as to engage justiciable notions of wrongdoing and engender remedial 
responsibilities.76  This includes everything from killing to privacy violations, criminal to 
tortious wrongs, labour rights violations, and so on.77 This is an exercise of compulsory power 
by a corporation upon an individual or group. Such cases are defined by a wrongful act being 
committed against the will of the victim that the victim was unable to prevent. The corporation 
must either actively commit the wrong or breach a duty of care. Access to remedy through 
grievance mechanisms generally relies on an individual or group demonstrating that a specific 
corporation acted so as to breach their rights causing a specific harm.78 This is therefore the 
most direct type of impact a corporation can have on an individual’s rights. This area also 
constitutes a major focal point of the BHR field.  
 
Second, businesses as employers have the power to directly impact employees. One example 
is the restructuring of employment to form the emergent ‘precariat’, constituted by new forms 
of insecure, temporary, and poorly-paid work.79 Corporations cannot compel individuals to 
take on such work, but they can create a system – with and through law - in which individuals 
are forced to choose such options. In human rights terms, conditions of just work are 
retrogressed by business actions,80 a situation which in theory creates pro tanto obligations 
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upon states to protect against this retrogression.81 This restructuring of the labour markets puts 
individuals in a position where their rights cannot be fulfilled due to a combination of low pay, 
irregular hours, and short-term contracts. Companies constituting the ‘gig economy’ such as 
Uber, are prevalent examples of such firms, while other industries are adopting similar 
models.82 A majority of academics, for example, in both the UK and Australia are on zero-hour 
or short-term contracts.83 The problem is rooted in a structural power: businesses have the 
scarce jobs or contracts to distribute and therefore businesses are able to gradually reduce the 
pay, security and benefits that go with a job. Automation threatens to exacerbate this problem.84 
A full range of human rights impacts stem from this. Such individuals are more likely to be 
classed as ‘working poor’.85 They may be coerced into breaching working hours standards.86 
They may be unable to realise other rights due to low pay or insecurity (such issues naturally 
invoke interrelated responsibilities of government),87 or suffer adverse mental or physical 
health impacts from the stress.88 Relatedly, private companies can surveil and discipline 
workers in new ways, marking worrying inroads into privacy rights and causing health 
impacts.89 Companies have adopted a range of tactics bearing similarities with Bentham’s 
Panopticon, the effect of which was to ‘induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent 
visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power’.90 One company photographs its 
remote workers through their laptop camera every ten minutes.91 Private chat messages are 
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routinely monitored,92 as is employee movement.93 Amazon warehouses monitor workers’ 
productivity rates along multiple variables to allow them to be pushed to, and often beyond, 
the limit.94 Such innovations place the workers under extreme stress. In the US, ‘from October 
2013 to October 2018, authorities responded to 911 calls at least 189 times for suicide attempts, 
suicidal thoughts, and other mental-health episodes at Amazon warehouses.’95  
 
A final example relates to marketing to vulnerable individuals. One example of an ‘adverse 
human rights impact’ provided for in the UNGPs is that of ‘[t]argeting high-sugar foods and 
drinks at children, with an impact on child obesity.’96 Corporate discursive power, here 
mobilized through advertising, is used to tempt, perhaps to coerce, vulnerable individuals into 
making lifestyle choices detrimental to their own health and beneficial to corporate profits. A 
similar, infamous, case is that of Nestlé’s breastmilk substitute advertising in developing 
countries,97 as well as the for-profit promotion of both dangerous beauty standards and of 
gambling. In each case vulnerable individuals are exploited in ways that, as the UNGPs note, 
can be readily-constructed as adverse human rights impacts, in these cases impacts upon the 
right to food and health, at least. While there is an element of personal choice in such cases, 
corporations spend vast amounts attempting to reconstruct these choices in ways beneficial to 
profits, and sometimes harmful to individuals.   
 
4.2. Power over Materialities 
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Materialities relate to the underlying material conditions on which rights rely. Corporate acts 
regularly reshape these conditions in ways which are not human rights violations, but which 
impact the underlying conditions constitutive of rights, development, and dignity. Herein I use 
material examples of housing, finance and the environment. Each represents a structural 
business power through which businesses reshape the possibilities for rights realization of 
individuals, often boosted by influence over institutions and discourses to reify and legitimize 
this power. This is further from the Weberian sense of power, focusing more on effects, because 
in each case mentioned, the corporate desire for greater profit causes undesired, but inevitable, 
harmful externalities.  
 
Commodified human rights such as food, housing, and aspects of healthcare are an obvious 
source of power over materialities. Commodification necessitates that, to some extent, market 
actors dictate the structural conditions of the human right. In most jurisdictions housing is 
primarily organized privately and for profit. The free market approach grants corporations 
power to profit from adverse impacts. In many major cities the affordability of housing is 
retrogressing with consequent effects on aspects such as habitability and location.98 Prices in 
Hong Kong, London, Munich and many other cities have ‘increased by over 50 per cent since 
2011’.99 Lower-income individuals are often forced out of these cities,100 or forced into often 
squalid, miniscule apartments lacking basic amenities.101 The UNSR on the right to housing 
tied this problem to business actors, stating that corporations use housing as a ‘safety deposit 
box’, investing particularly in already-inflated major cities safe in the knowledge value will 
accrue.102 In Ireland, Australia and Hong Kong, corporations practice various forms of land-
hoarding to keep prices high.103 The investment firm Blackstone has become the world’s largest 
private landlord and is accused of exploiting every possible loophole to drive up tenancy costs 
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and weaken protections. 104  New, more exploitative contract forms are frequently developed.105 
Businesses, assisted by laws conducive to business,106 have transformed housing from a social 
good into a commodity. This business control over housing creates demonstrable effects in 
terms of rising prices, rising debt and rising homelessness,107 each of which are easily 
expressible as breaches of fundamental elements of the right to housing.108   
 
Finance provides a second area through which the materialities of rights can be impacted. 
Corporations have power over the structures of global finance, and as individual actors have 
means within this structure by which they can profit from harm.109 One of the most critical 
problems related to finance today is that of tax avoidance and tax evasion. ‘The equivalent of 
10% of global GDP is held offshore by rich individuals in the form of bank deposits, equities, 
bonds and mutual fund shares, most of the time in the name of faceless shell corporations, 
foundations and trusts.’110 ‘Six European tax havens alone (Luxembourg, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Malta and Cyprus) siphon off a total of €350bn every year.’111 ‘Tax 
havens deprive the EU of the equivalent of a fifth of the corporate tax revenue it currently 
collects. This represents a cost of €60bn per a year.’112 Wealth concealment deprives 
governments globally of about €155bn a year in revenue.113 One of the most damaging forms 
of tax avoidance in the developing world is transfer mispricing. This accounts for 60% of tax 
avoidance in Africa. A corporation working in a developing country sells a major product at 
an artificially low price to a subsidiary in a tax haven. The subsidiary then sells the product at 
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the market price, thereby avoiding most tax. State-owned mines in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) were sold to anonymous shell companies in the Virgin Islands this way.114 This 
‘cost the DRC US$1.35 billion, which is twice the education and health budget of a country 
where 71.3% of the population currently lives below the poverty line.’115 Tax avoidance 
reduces the ability of states to protect rights. 116 Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, as UNSR on 
extreme poverty and human rights, states that tax avoidance breaches the responsibility to 
respect, ‘insofar as [it has] a negative human rights impact’.117 Tax avoidance is a good 
example of corporate power over human rights because while it is not a direct breach of a 
specific human rights rule it provably weakens the socio-economic base needed to protect 
human rights with inevitable, severe consequences for human rights realization.118 
 
A third material element is that of land and the environment. Corporate activity causes severe 
harmful effects on environment and land, from the compulsive, in the form of land acquisition, 
to the structural, through the literal reconstituting of land through climate change causing 
flooding and drought. Many BHR-related legal cases stem from environmental issues,119 and 
the risks go beyond that which are currently justiciable. Corporations are the primary producers 
of carbon dioxide and other pollutants causing air pollution and associated health problems, 
ocean acidification and climate change. Indeed, corporations and global economic activity are 
so involved in pollution that some suggest renaming the Anthropocene era the 
‘Capitalocene’.120 Climate change is a major global issue today, and therefore business 
responsibility is slightly more advanced.121 The OHCHR has stated that businesses should be 
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held ‘accountable for their climate impacts’,122 and John Knox, the UN Special Rapporteur 
(UNSR) on Human Rights and the Environment, has elaborated business responsibilities 
related to climate change.123 Many severe human rights impacts can be traced to climate 
change, not least for those in low-lying areas who face serious risks to rights to life, food, 
health, and numerous concomitant impacts.124 Big companies, from oil to manufacturing to 
transport, are driving these dangerous changes, reshaping communities that they will never 
meet. 
 
4.3. Power over Institutions 
 
This section contains three brief examples designed to map different levels of power over 
institutions. These are lobbying, a primarily relational power to influence a state; the structural 
power of free-moving capital’s advantages over jurisdictionally-bounded states; and 
privatization, which flows from social norms, structures and relational bargaining.  
 
Lobbying is a relational power that corporations can have over states. It may be used for a 
single purpose or may be industry-wide and ongoing. An example of the latter is US healthcare. 
US companies have a responsibility to respect the right to health under the UNGPs despite the 
ICESCR not being ratified in the US.125 Since 2007, over $3billion dollars has been spent 
annually in the US by lobbyists, almost all by business.126 Health topped the list in 2016, with 
finance, electronics and energy – all industries fighting ongoing political battles – close 
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behind.127 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), the American 
Hospital Association, the American Medical Association and Blue Cross/Blue Shield (a health 
insurance firm) make up four of the top seven spots over the last twenty years, each with over 
$300 million in total expenditure.128 Purdue Pharma is one of the corporations most tied to the 
opioid epidemic, and regularly gives around $1 million per year to politicians.129 This epidemic 
is blamed in part on the huge volume of prescription drugs handed out by doctors, working for 
private health companies.130 Other problems in US healthcare stem directly from costs. One 
famous case is that Martin Shkreli, whose firm increased the price of the drug Daraprim from 
$13.50 a pill to $750 a pill in 2015.131 Other cases include Harvoni, a hepatitis C drug, that 
costs $10,000 more in the US than anywhere else, while cancer drug Avastin costs three times 
the next highest price globally.132 Costs for emergency treatments are also significant, with the 
growth of ‘facility fees’, fees charged to attend emergency rooms, a recent issue. One patient 
with a back problem was charged $3.50 for a muscle relaxant and $2,426.34 in facility fees.133 
Another paid $629, of which $7 was for a Band-Aid and the rest in facility fees.134 These fees 
have wider impacts, such as medical bills being the single largest cause of consumer 
bankruptcy, at between 18 percent and 25 percent of cases.135 Minorities and children are 
disproportionately uninsured.136 Through lobbying, corporations are able to exercise relational 
power over politicians, in so doing answering key questions related to the right to health in 
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favour of corporate interests, and causing what appear to be prima facie adverse impacts upon 
access to the right. 
 
Second, corporations have power over human rights from their structural position as free-
moving actors contrasted with that of jurisdictionally-bounded states. States require investment 
and jobs that corporations provide and therefore corporations have, in aggregate, the power to 
coerce pro-business policies. Benvenisti puts this in terms of a ‘global prisoner’s dilemma’, in 
which states are fully aware that they are trading away their resources, rights, and democracy, 
but can do nothing to stop it.137 One institutionalized element of this relationship is investor-
state dispute settlement, wherein companies are granted the right to sue governments for 
breaching agreements.138  Supply chains, particularly in manufacturing, are one example of the 
power of transnational capital and the competitive nature of the modern state. This power is 
partly grounded in a direct power over individuals with similar dynamics to that of the precariat, 
but also in more comprehensive powers over the state to coerce favourable policies. 
Developing states with labour surpluses want to become manufacturing hubs, and the most 
important metric on which to compete is price. Although there are several regulatory initiatives 
covering supply chain factories,139 workers and states are trapped in a system where new, 
cheaper labour markets keep entering, most recently Myanmar and Ethiopia.140 This creates 
conflicting pressures on costs. Unions in Cambodia state that the current minimum wage level 
‘does not allow workers to live with dignity’, yet from the business perspective it ‘makes it a 
challenge for Cambodia to stay competitive.’141 In Bangladesh, garment factories pay only 15% 
tax, significantly lower than most sectors, to help them compete.142 The need to attract 
investment minimalizes the developmental gains of investment, impacting rights from the right 
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to just work to the right to life.143 This market structuring power, while a root cause of rights 
non-realization, does not easily fit individualized business responsibilities, because no 
company is to blame for the market reality. It is nonetheless a system rife with exploitations 
and violations, from pay to sexual abuse and that hinders comprehensive rights realization. 
 
Finally, corporations can be granted power over a human right by a state through privatization. 
Fuchs notes that this ‘reflects the acquisition of discursive power by business because it 
demonstrates a change in attitude toward the market and market actors that has allowed 
business to obtain political authority.’144 This is a similar root to self-regulation, wherein again 
the corporation is granted specific authority.145 Privatization is an accepted means by which 
states may choose to fulfil their human rights obligation but carries risks.146 In General 
Comment 24 the CESCR describe privatization as ‘[posing] new challenges… [p]rivatization 
is not per se prohibited [but should] be subject to strict regulations… this may include 
requirements concerning universality of coverage and the continuity of the service, pricing 
policies, quality requirements, and user participation.’147 One of the most contentious areas of 
privatization is security, prisons and immigration management. G4S has been criticized for its 
running of Brook House Immigration Removal Centre in the UK, where ‘widespread self-harm 
and attempted suicides’ was discovered, with obvious rights implications.148 G4S is also facing 
lawsuits for its role in the well-documented conditions on Manus Island, part of Australia’s 
immigration detention system.149 Returning to Fuchs notion of ‘political authority’ it is worth 
noting that the greater involvement a firm like G4S has in running detention centres, the more 
expert and legitimate its views may appear to governments. This will shape some big decisions, 
such as whether violence by a detainee is treated with confinement and loss of privileges or by 
providing social care. G4S’s desire for profit may in turn shape its choice of recommendations. 
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4.4. Power over Knowledge 
 
Finally, corporations have power over knowledge and norms within human rights. Here the 
effects on human rights themselves will be a product of the knowledge produced therein. This 
area of power is fundamentally distinct from the others because it cannot be linked to any 
outcome that could be termed a human rights impact or any other form of breach. It is primarily 
a power to redefine the scope of their responsibilities and to legitimize corporations as human 
rights actors. Related forms include power over information related to rights, such as the 
allegation that Facebook’s algorithm helped stoke anti-Rohingya feelings in Myanmar,150 and 
the power to reshape wider discourses, such as the Koch Brothers longstanding research, public 
relations and campaigning agenda into libertarian politics in the US.151 In this section I focus 
on three issues: that at the intra-corporate level, corporations can determine how they address 
rights; that from this they have the power to determine their own rights priorities and 
exclusions, in so doing affecting global rights discourse, and that corporations are increasingly 
seeking to influence human rights institutions. 
 
First, they have the power to decide, or at least influence, how they choose to address human 
rights. Here, they subsume human rights responsibilities into managerial practices. ‘Human 
rights are articulated as a matter of risk, within “familiar frames” of business discourse, 
drawing them into operational technologies of measurement and management.’152 Human 
rights become managerial targets rather than ideals. These internalized discourses ensure that 
rights ‘can never fulfil any radical potential we may think they contain’153. For Scheper, 
business engagement with human rights performs a disciplinary function towards their 
critics,154 as businesses welcome engagement over human rights issues and partnerships with 
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NGOs and others,155 while concurrently educating these organizations as to the distinct 
pressures businesses face in meeting human rights responsibilities.156 Thus, the passionate 
animosity of the 1990s anti-globalization movement is neutered in exchange for a more 
practical approach.157 This approach has the benefit of producing more immediate, tangible 
gains than its opposite, but only by reneging on any promise that rights could lead to the 
fulfilment of human development. 
 
Second, the managerialism of human rights produces certain priorities and exclusions. 
Priorities include those civil and political rights issues that are largely uncontroversial in their 
major markets. Exclusions cover those areas most directly related to profit, not least labour 
rights issues that they could, if so motivated, easily address. Companies use human rights to 
reconstruct their image along ‘social purpose’ lines.158 Wettstein and Baur identify examples 
of corporations speaking out in favour of refugees, marriage equality, and anti-racism.159 Here 
corporations are behaving as political activists. However, they are activists with specific 
priorities, including rarely or never take controversial stances in major markets. Nike has made 
very progressive advertisements challenging racial discrimination in the US,160 but also pulled 
a line of shoes from sale in mainland China because the designer voiced support for greater 
autonomy in Hong Kong.161 While racial discrimination is hardly a settled subject in the US, 
these examples suggest that a strategic choice was made that the former would be in aggregate 
good for business, and the latter not. Barclay’s sponsorship of London Pride can be contrasted 
with its promotion of large-scale tax avoidance in some of the poorest sub-Saharan African 
states.162 This suggests a strong, and logical, preference for those progressive causes that assist, 
or at least do not threaten, their core business. It hardly needs explicating that these companies 
could far more effectively address their own socio-economic impacts than they can address 
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enculturated discrimination. Progressive agendas can be conceived as an attempt to build 
political capital that can be used to stultify critique over other issues more connected to profits. 
Human rights responsibilities are proving acceptable insofar as they do not hurt the share price.  
 
Finally, corporations – and more so the profit motive – is increasingly impacting the field of 
BHR itself. As Deva frames, there is developing shift from business and human rights, to the 
business of human rights.163 This encompasses the managerial practices above, but also the 
mushrooming BHR consultancy business, where a symbiosis between corporations and 
consultants develops around issues of practice such as human rights due diligence. The 
consultants want clients and are incentivized to construct responsibilities in an achievable way. 
Businesses gain the kudos of having a legitimate outside agent manage their human rights 
issues.164 This manifests particularly at the UN Forum on Business and Human Rights, where 
both companies and consultants dominate proceedings, while critical voices are marginalized. 
Van Ho notes that at the 2019 Forum just 4.2 per cent of speakers were from academia,165 and 
that ‘Nestlé [were granted] a forum for self-promotion on their work in the cocoa industry’ 
despite causing ongoing harm therein.’166 A related issue is the growing corporate influence at 
the UN, wherein corporations are seen as essential development partners, particularly spurred 
by the Global Compact and efforts to meet the Sustainable Development Goals.167 Again, their 
voice is elevated, legitimized, and therefore made more powerful. While some managers may 
desire to help, and win-win cases do exist, these companies remain profit-driven and will not 
be answering questions of rights and development from a purely rights-based perspective. 
Powerful corporate voice at these important institutions carries evident risks for future human 
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This article has addressed the issue of corporate power over human rights. Using theories of 
power developed primarily within international relations literature, I have argued that 
corporations hold power within four distinct sites relevant to human rights: power over 
individuals; power over materialities; power over institutions; and power over knowledge. This 
disaggregation contributes towards evolving understandings of the extent of business impacts 
upon human rights and provides a framework through which researchers can think about this 
broader range of impacts. It encourages researchers to dig down into the political economy of 
corporate activity and its effects on human rights, and to note the various means by which rights 
possibilities may be stifled a priori to current modes of legal enforcement or proactive corporate 
responsibility policy. It may be of assistance in considering the scope of the UNGPs and of the 
forthcoming business and human rights binding treaty.168 It serves a further function in 
providing linkages between disparate forms of corporate activity. A corporation that may be 
discursively supportive of human rights and with no ongoing legal cases may still be working 
against human rights in another area, and this framework allows these contrasts to be 
highlighted.  
I have focused on providing examples that are intrinsic to contemporary business practice, 
serious, and easily understood, while also balancing some mainstream BHR issues with those 
largely beyond the current scope. Inevitably, many rights-issues have not been directly covered, 
such as racial and gender discrimination, children’s rights, cultural rights, and conflict. 
Corporations undoubtedly have a role in shaping child development, for example, through 
advertising, products, media, and online entertainment and their actions therein may cause 
harm to child’s rights. One of the most important uses of this framework would be to turn it to 
such specific cases to understand the impacts therein. Equally useful would be to focus on a 
specific company to understand its operations within the four sites. Such projects should help 
to underlie the development of a more comprehensive form of BHR, in which corporations are 
encouraged to respect all human rights through all exercises of their power in the global 
economy.  
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